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Abstract
We study trade patterns in a pure exchange economy where preferences are symmetric up to
taste intensity parameters. In a 2−person, 2−good endowment economy, then all endowments
in a particular Edgeworth box rectangle require trading out of that rectangle. Under strictly
quasi−concave preferences, trade will occur away from a larger area of initial endowments.
The identified area is larger still when preferences are homothetic and identical up to taste
intensity parameters. Implications for the factor price equalization theorem are explored.
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1.    Introduction 
Symmetry and market exchange are intimately related phenomena.  Market transactions 
are motivated by asymmetries in tastes or endowments.  Consequently, in a pure exchange 
economy there should be fundamental structural relationships between the nature of 
asymmetries among consumers, equilibrium decisions by consumers, and the equilibrium 
prices that guide these decisions.  Our interest is in identifying and characterizing how 
heterogeneities in tastes over the set of available goods affect general equilibrium.  We show 
how particular forms of heterogeneities among consumers imply that certain consumption 
bundles, and so certain endowment-dependent trade patterns, cannot be supported regardless 
of consumer income levels.  This is because the terms of trade to support these equilibria are 
inconsistent with consumer preferences, when considered collectively. 
To identify cardinal aspects of general equilibrium relationships in a pure exchange 
economy it is necessary to employ tools that model similarities and dissimilarities in 
preferences and endowments.  Mathematical science provides a number of related tools, such 
as the theories of group structures and vector majorization, to model structural symmetries.  
These tools have been used in diverse fields of economics, as in Samuelson and Swamy 
(1974), Sato (1981), Balasko (1990), and Chambers and Quiggin (2000).  Hennessy and 
Lapan (2003a, 2003b), who studied firm-level production decisions (2003a) and investor-
level portfolio allocation decisions (2003b), provide the most direct links to the approach we 
will take.  Their analyses exploit the symmetries of a functional when a group acts on the 
functional’s arguments.  Contradictions then generate bounds on optimal decision vectors.  
The present analysis is also built upon the contradictions that symmetries can generate.  In 
a 2-agent, 2-good pure exchange economy, we use invariances to show when some trade 
pattern, call it E-I, must occur.  When monotone utility functions are bilaterally symmetric up 
to symmetry-breaking scale parameters then conditions exist such that an endowment 
partition located in one rectangle of the Edgeworth box must support trade pattern E-I.  These 
conditions pertain to the relative strength of preferences and the relative scarcity of 
endowments.  If, in addition to bilateral symmetry, the utility functions are quasi-concave 
then the region in the allocation box that supports trade pattern E-I may be expanded to 
include two additional contiguous triangles.  If, as well, preferences are homothetic, are 
identical apart from taste intensity parameters, and possess an elasticity of substitution less 
than unity, then the region supporting E-I is larger still.  When considered separately, neither 
identical preferences nor homothetic preferences support the larger precluded region. 
 
2.    Motivation 
In a 2-person pure exchange economy, goods A and B are available in the amounts  a q  and 
b q .  Person 1 has composite utility function 
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   continuously differentiable, monotone increasing maps, while functionals 
1[,] U ⋅⋅ and 
2[,] U ⋅⋅ are 
2 →    .  All are strictly increasing (i.e., monotone or non-satiated) and once 
continuously differentiable.  There is no waste in allocation and the goods are scarce, so that 
efficiency requires both  1, 2, aa a qq q +=  and  1, 2, bb b qq q + = .  We ask what can be inferred about 
trade patterns, about Pareto efficient divisions of  a q  and  b q , as well as about how prices and 
quantities relate in general equilibrium.   2
Further assumptions are clearly necessary.  Because Pareto efficiency requires the 
exhaustion of exchange opportunities due to consumer heterogeneities, the assumptions will 
involve restrictions on how goods substitute within a consumer’s basket of purchases.  We 
place symmetry restrictions on a consumer’s iso-utility trade-offs.  Pareto improving re-
allocations can then be identified by using the symmetries to hold the utility level of one 
consumer constant while freeing up endowments to make the other consumer better off. 
Asymmetries are necessary to model taste differences, while it is necessary to modularize 
the asymmetries if meaningful insights are to be found.  We model these asymmetries through 
the superscripted  () T ⋅  functions.  The structure on the symmetries are modeled through the 
assumption that 
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To illustrate, we study ray linear  () T ⋅  functions; 
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,, 2 , ib ib qi θ ∈Ω , where the θ  values are strictly positive, symmetry-breaking, taste intensity 
heterogeneities.
1  Our line of approach exploits the invariances of the two functions 
1
1, 1, 1, 1, [,] aa bb Uq q θθ and 
2
2, 2, 2, 2, [,] aa bb Uq q θθ.  The ratios  11 ,1 , / ab z θ θ =  and  2 z =  2, 2, / ab θ θ  are 
clearly important in this regard because they gauge a consumer’s personal relative intensity of 
preference for good A.  Ratio  / qb a zq q =  should also be important because it measures the 
relative economy-wide scarcity of good A. 
 
3.    Symmetric and monotone utility 
Denote the set of Pareto efficient allocations as Q    with sample elements given by the 
allocation 2-vector  1, 1, 2, 2, {( , )',( , )'} ab ab qq qq       , where “'” is the vector transpose operation.  The 
endowment constraint determines two of the points in this quadruple.  Apart from 
singularities arising from any of the relations  1 q zz = ,  2 q zz = , or  12 zz = , there are essentially 
two contexts to be considered.  When  12 () zz ><  then person 1 (person 2) has a stronger 
comparative preference for good A.  Without further loss of generality, and ignoring equality 
in relative preference intensities for the moment, we may assign the order  12 zz > .  Also, 
define  11 / q rz z =  and  22 / q rz z =  to account for the relative abundance of endowments, and so 
our assignment is equivalent to  12 rr > .   
Upon, again, ignoring singularities that may be studied separately, we may assume that 
either  21 (,) q zz z ∈  or  21 [,] q zz z ∉ .  Defining  1,a q   aa q δ =  and  1,bb b qq δ =   , the endowment 
constraints require  2, (1 ) aa a qq δ =−    and  2,b q   (1 ) bb q δ = − .  After exploiting invariances, it is 
clear that bilateral symmetry in the utility functionals imply 
1
1, 1, [,] aaa bbb Uqq θδ θδ =  
1
1, 1 1, 1 [/ , ] abb baa Uq zq z θδ θδ .  Denoting the bundle indifference relation by ∼  and identifying 
vectors  1 (,) ' aa bb cq q δ δ =
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+ =
 
11 (/ , ) ' bb aa qz q z δ δ , we have  11 cc
+    
∼ .  Similarly, if we define 
2 ((1 ) ,(1 ) )' aa bb cq q δ δ =− −
 
 and  22 2 ((1 ) / ,(1 ) )' bb aa cq z q z δδ
+ =− −
 
, then  22 cc
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∼ .  However, 
and this is the foundation of our analysis, if pair  12 {,} cc
+ +    
 frees up resources then pair  12 {, } cc
   
 
                                                 
1 The approach for general transformations is sketched out in appendix A.   3
cannot be Pareto efficient.
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PROPOSITION  1.  Let the preference functionals 
1[,] U ⋅ ⋅  and 
2[,] U ⋅ ⋅  be monotone and also 
symmetric functions of the ray linear  () T ⋅  functions, while  12 1 rr >> .  Then any endowment in 












   (1) 
with one inequality strict, will require a trade pattern in which Person 1 exports good B and 
imports good A. 
 
The situation is depicted in Figure 1, where  (, 0 ) aa Qq =  and  (0, ) bb Qq = .  Line  1, L1: b q =  
1, 1, 1, 1 1, / aa b a qz q θ θ =  from O1, the consumer 1 origin, gives the locus of consumption bundles 
that are invariant under the iso-utility symmetry for that consumer.  These bundles sit on the 
consumer 1 axis of symmetry (AS1).  Line  2, 2, 2, 2, 2 2, L2: / ba a b a qq z q θ θ = =  performs the same 
role for consumer 2.  Lines Li are rays from the origin Oi because 
1[0,0] U  is invariant to 
permutation on the arguments.  Conditions  12 1 rr >>  require that these two AS lines intersect 
in the interior of the box and northwest of the diagonal line (L3) between the two origins.  The 













so that (1) may be interpreted as the pair of requirements  ˆˆ , aa bb δ δδ δ ≤ ≥ .  
Under these conditions we may rule out all points except the southeastern vertex, Y, of the 
northwestern rectangle in the Edgeworth box.  The rectangle is shaded in Figure 1.  For any 
point inside this inadmissible region there is a point somewhere else in the Edgeworth box 
such that both consumers are as well off while at least one of the resource constraints is slack.  
Vertex Y is special because it is the unique fixed point where the known invariances of both 
consumer utilities do not even alter the values of either bundle. 
For a more detailed version of the argument, pick a candidate equilibrium point 
1, 1, 2, 2, {( , )',( , )'} ab ab qq qq        that happens to be in the inadmissible region of the Edgeworth box.  
There  1, 1, (,) ab qq   , as measured from O1, coincides with  2, 2, (,) ab qq   , as measured from O2.  The 
points must coincide for a Pareto efficient equilibrium under strict monotonicity.  Map 
1, 1, 1, 1, ˆˆ (,)(,) ab ab qq qq →    , with  1, 1, 1 ˆ / ab qq z =    and  1, 1, 1 ˆ ba qq z =   , is also provided in the diagram.  
Map  2, 2, 2, 2, ˆˆ (,)(,) ab ab qq qq →    , with  2, 2, 2 ˆ / ab qq z =    and  2, 2, 2 ˆ ba qq z =   , is distinct, and so one must 
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   (3) 
The endowment constraints are not broken because the slope (really an arc marginal rate 
of substitution) for map  1, 1, 1, 1, ˆˆ (,)(,) ab ab qq qq →    , being  1 z − , differs from the slope for map 
                                                 
2 Proofs are provided in appendix B.   4
2, 2, 2, 2, ˆˆ (,)(,) ab ab qq qq →    ,  2 z − .  The supermodular nature of the transformations,  q θ , ensures 
that resources are freed up.  The  released resources are represented by the vector between the 
map image points in Figure 1.  An endowment vector located in the inadmissible region 
requires a trade to a consumption bundle outside the region and southeast of the bundle.  
Figure 2 identifies the endowment-conditioned admissible region, and we see that person 1 
must barter out of good B. 
 
4.    Allocation under strictly quasi-concave utility 
At this point we require both utility functions to be strictly quasi-concave so that the level 
sets are strictly convex and any equilibrium is unique.  Symmetry, together with continuous 
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where  []
i
j U ⋅  represents the derivative with respect to the functional’s j
th argument.  With 
scaling symmetry breakers we have that efficient equilibria must satisfy  
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ii
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Notice that, due to continuity,  12 [] []
ii UU ⋅ =⋅  on the respective AS lines under quasi-
concavity so that the marginal rates of substitution along the AS lines are given by  
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 (6) 
The symmetry assumption, together with the scalar structure of the transformation functions, 
impose a local form of ray homotheticity on preference structures.  The importance of strict 
quasi-concavity lies in the fact that any interior convex combinations of iso-utility points are 
Pareto improving, if feasible.
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PROPOSITION  2.  In addition to the assumptions in Proposition 1, let 
1[,] U ⋅⋅ and 
2[,] U ⋅⋅ be 
quasiconcave in the consumption arguments.  Then any endowment in the Edgeworth box 
rectangle defined by (,)[ 0 , 1 ][ 0 , 1 ] ab δ δ ∈× with 
  [ ] 12 2 max , 1 ba a rr r δδ δ ≥+ −  (7) 
will require a trade pattern in which Person 1 exports good B and imports good A. 
 
An intuitive approach to confirming (7) is to note that any point such that the marginal 
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 (8) 
Upon requiring  12 zz > , the bounds in (8) also deliver (7). 
                                                 
3 See Marshall and Olkin (1979, p. 57 and p. 69).  See Chambers and Quiggin (2000) for 
economic applications of the condition. 
4 Notice that  12 2 /( 1 ) / bb a rr r δ δδ =+ − =  defines point Y as given in Figure 1.   5
If, instead, we knew that  12 rr = , i.e.,  12 zz = , then a larger region in the Edgeworth box 
















as well as those such that 
 













The geometry of the excluded region depends upon the magnitudes of the  i r  relative to 
unity.  The situation for  12 1 rr >>  is depicted in Figure 3.  We leave it to the interested reader 
to study the other cases.  The dashed parallel lines are tangents to some isoquant along that 
utility function’s AS line.  Because the AS lines intersect inside the box, at Y, it is clear from 
(6) above that the tangents on the AS lines must intersect to the north of L1 and west of L2.  
But any point north of L1 and west of L2 cannot be efficient because the utility indifference 
curves cannot be tangent there, i.e.,  1, 1, 2, 2, // ab ab θ θθ θ − <− .  For any given pair of AS, this 
trapezoid is larger than the area precluded in Figure 1.  Quasi-concavity buys us the 
difference, namely two right-angled triangles each with a vertex at point Y. 
A geometric interpretation of quasi-concavity is that, to exclude a point as an equilibrium 
consumption point, we only need to know that some point on the line segment connecting the 
original consumption point for person 2 with its reflection lies northeast of some point on the 
comparable line segment for person 1.  Suppose point K  in Figure 3 is posited as being 
Pareto efficient.  It lies outside the excluded rectangle given in Figure 1, but it satisfies 
condition (7).  To see why it can be excluded, observe the point’s reflections through the two 
axes.  For person 1 the reflected point is  ' K , while for person 2 it is  '' K .  Although  ' K  and 
'' K  are not comparable, a point on segment  '' KK  is northeast of a point on segment  ' KK .  
This means that by giving each person some convex combination of his original point and its 
reflection, a surplus of goods can be created.  But at these same convex combinations the 
respective consumers are at least weakly better off.  If K  is the initial endowment point then 
consumers trade south and east. 
 
5.    Allocation under strictly quasi-concave and homothetic utility 
As one might expect, the imposition of homotheticity can further expand the endowment 
set for which the trade pattern is certain.  The argument concerns a comparison of slopes away 
from the axes of symmetry.  We have  
  1
1
1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 1
11 1 1 []  f i x e d
1 , 1 , 21 ,1 , 1 ,1 , 1 ,1 ,
[,]
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U
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dq U q q q r
zx x
dq U q q q
θθ θ θ δ
φ
θ θθ θ δ
⋅ −= = ≡ =  (11) 
where 
1() φ ⋅  is the marginal rate of substitution function with respect to the transformed 
‘goods’  1, 1, aa q θ  and  1, 1, bb q θ , and where homotheticity has been used to express the ratio in 
terms of relative consumption.  If person 2 also has a homothetic utility function, then 
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2() φ ⋅  as the marginal rate of substitution function with respect to transformed ‘goods’   6
2, 2, aa q θ  and  2, 2, bb q θ . 
Following the earlier analysis we would like to identify a domain on which the marginal 
rates of substitution cannot be common across the consumers.  In this regard identical 
preferences, where we mean that 
12 ( ', '') ( ', '') UTT UTT ≡ , by itself does not help.  Similarly, 
homotheticity by itself does not help.  However under identical and homothetic preferences, 
so that bilateral symmetry then implies 
12 (1) (1) 1 φφ = = , we can conclude: 
  12
1, 2,
12 12 [ ] fixed [ ] fixed
1, 2,







⋅⋅ >− > − ≤  (13) 
We cannot extend the deduction to the half-space  12 x x >  because we do not know how 
rapidly the marginal rate of substitution declines. 
To summarize the contradiction that (13) provides, insert (11) and (12) and infer 
 
PROPOSITION  3.  In addition to the assumptions in Proposition 2, let 
1[,] U ⋅⋅ and 
2[,] U ⋅⋅ be 
homothetic in the consumption arguments and identical, i.e., 
12 ( ', '') ( ', '') UTT UTT ≡ .   
A) If  12 zz = , then the diagonal is the Pareto efficient set so that agents will trade to the 
diagonal. 
B) If  12 zz >  then any endowment in the Edgeworth box rectangle defined by (,)[ 0 , 1 ] ab δ δ ∈×  

















will require a trade pattern in which Person 1 exports good B and imports good A. 
 
Part A) is well-known.  It arises because (13) then provides  12 x x ≤  and  12 x x ≥  where 
12 x x =  defines the main diagonal.  As for part B), an inspection of (2) reveals that 
* () b δ ≥≤ 
1 ar δ  according as  ˆ () aa δ δ ≤≥ , while we also have that 
*
22 () 1 ba rr δδ ≥≤ +−  according as  a δ ≥ 
ˆ ()a δ ≤ .  Put another way, we can write 
** () bb a δ δδ =  and make the following observations.  The 
function passes through the point  ˆˆ (,) ab δ δ .  It crosses L1 just once on the interior, and from 
above as  a δ  increases.  The function also crosses L2 just once (again at  ˆˆ (,) ab δ δ ) on the 




22 1 22 1 ˆˆ ( ) (1 ) , ( ) (1 ) . aa a ba aa a ba rr r rr r δδ δ δδ δδ δ δδ ≤⇒ + − ≥ ≥ >⇒ + − ≤ ≤  (15) 
Upon imposing the weaker of the two inequalities in either direction we have  
 
*
12 2 12 2 max[ , 1 ] min[ , 1 ] aa b aa rr r rr r δδ δ δδ +− ≥ ≥ +−  (16) 
regardless of the evaluation of  a δ .  Comparing with the bound in (7),  b δ ≥ 
12 2 max[ , 1 ] aa rr r δ δ +− , the joint impositions of identical homothetic  ( )
i U ⋅  does (weakly at 
any rate) extend the set of excludable points on ( , ) [0,1] [0,1] ab δ δ ∈ × . 
The extent to which the additional assumptions lead to the ruling out of a strictly larger 
area depends upon where the efficiency locus occurs relative to the principal diagonal.  As is   7
well-known, with homothetic preferences the efficiency locus cannot cut the diagonal, i.e., it 
either coincides with the diagonal or only the end points are common.  If  1 z = 2 z  then the 
efficiency locus is the main diagonal.  Relative to this benchmark and for a given pair of 
allocation vectors, suppose we then increase the value of  1 z .  The effect is to increase the 
marginal rate of substitution for person 1 whenever the elasticity of substitution exceeds 
unity,  1 σ > , and to decrease the marginal rate whenever  1 σ < .  For  12 zz > , the efficiency 
locus must be above the principal diagonal whenever  1 σ < .  In that case, (14) combines with 
the diagonal to provide tight bounds on the Pareto efficient set.  However, when the elasticity 
of substitution exceeds unity then the efficiency locus will be below the main diagonal and 
(14) bears no information beyond that given by homotheticity and this knowledge on the 
elasticity of substitution. 
Astute readers will note that this analysis can be applied to a two good, two factor model.  
In the re-interpreted model, consumers represent output, e.g., Person 1 becomes Good M and 
Person 2 becomes Good C, while the utility functions become the production functions.  
Comparably, the goods of the exchange model become the inputs ( ) , A KB L →→  of the 
production model.  The basic technological assumption is that the two sectors have identical 
and symmetric production functions, but the degree of factor-augmenting technical progress, 
, ij θ , may differ across inputs and sectors.  In this reinterpretation,  12 zz >  implies that 
“technical progress” is relatively capital-augmenting in sector 1 (M) as compared to sector 2 
(C),
5 while  1
i r >  implies that, in sector i efficiency units, the economy is relatively “capital-
rich” (i.e., in sector i units, the effective supply of capital exceeds that of labor). 
If we assume, as is common, that production functions exhibit constant returns to scale 
(and hence are homothetic), the analysis underlying Proposition 3 rules out certain input 
allocations as being efficient.  In particular, assuming 
12 1 rr >> , then no input allocation in 
the region defined by (14) can yield production efficiency.  If we know that  1 σ < , then points 
on or below the main diagonal can be also excluded, so the efficient allocation must satisfy  
  ()
* . ba b a δ δδ δ ≥≥ (17) 
If  1 σ >  then all allocations above the diagonal can be excluded.
6 
Finally, the question arises as to whether this technique allows one to say for which initial 
allocations of resources free trade cannot lead to factor price equalization (FPE) between two 
countries, say the US and the EU.  First, to allow for the possibility of FPE, in addition to the 
preceding assumptions we must assume that the US and EU have identical technologies.  
Given this assumption, the preceding analysis identifies where an efficient world input 
allocation - when factor mobility is allowed - may (or may not) occur.  To see whether this 
integrated equilibrium (i.e., one with factor mobility) can be supported by free trade alone 
entails identifying the actual equilibrium (where factor and goods markets clear), and then 
considering whether national factor endowments lie within the “cone of diversification.”
7 
                                                 
5 Given the assumed identical production function across sectors,  12 zz >  implies that sector 1 
(M) is capital-intensive compared to sector C if  1 σ > , while sector 1 is the labor-intensive 
sector if  1 σ < . 
6 If  1 σ = , i.e., if technology is Cobb-Douglas, then the assumptions imply that factor 
intensities will be the same in the two sectors, and the efficiency locus is the main diagonal. 
7 This region is found by locating the specific efficient world allocation of capital and labor   8
To be precise, let Φ be the set of input allocations that may correspond to production 
efficiency
8 and let φ∈Φ.  Suppose φ  is the actual equilibrium allocation under free trade and 
factor mobility; corresponding to φ  there is a set of input allocations between the two countries 
that support this efficient allocation through free trade alone; call this set  () φ Κ .
9  If we knew 
φ  were the actual equilibrium, then we would know the set of input allocations across 
countries that supported FPE (and hence the set of allocations that do not support FPE).  
However, if our knowledge is limited to the technology assumptions given above, then we 
must allow for the possibility the integrated equilibrium may be any element of Φ.  Thus, 
define:  () φ φ ∈Κ Χ= Κ ∪ ; if the input allocation between countries is not in this set, then free 
trade cannot lead to FPE; however, whether free trade does lead to FPE cannot be ascertained 
without knowing which equilibrium occurs as well as knowing the input allocation.
10  
Finally, what does set Χ (or its complement) look like?  For  1 σ > , since any point below 
the main diagonal can represent production efficiency, set Χ includes the whole (Edgeworth) 
box, and its complement is empty.  Hence we cannot a priori identify allocations that cannot 
lead to FPE.  On the other hand, if  1 σ < , then only points which satisfy condition (17) (i.e., 
points above the main diagonal and below the 
*
b δ  locus) are candidates for efficient 
production, and hence the set of points which are candidates for FPE (the set Χ) lies within 
the set determined by the 
*
b δ  locus and its reflection around the diagonal.  All input allocations 
outside this set cannot support FPE through free trade. 
 
6.    Conclusion 
By way of the notion of exchange, we have developed several sets of relationships that 
symmetries and controlled heterogeneities in the primitives underlying a pure endowment 
economy imply for trade patterns in an efficient equilibrium.  While we have confined the 
analysis to invariances in a 2-agent, 2-good economy, the framework naturally extends to 
more general sets of invariances.  Then group theory and majorization theory, together with 
work in Eaton and Perlman (1977), may be useful.  
Because symmetry structures have such strong implications for the nature of an efficient 
equilibrium, they should also have implications for how a failure in conditions underlying 
efficiency affects equilibrium.  A number of extensions to the present work then arise 
naturally.  What, for example, can symmetries in technologies and preferences convey when 
market power leads to strategic interaction?  Symmetry structures on consumer preferences 
                                                                                                                                                             
between the two goods, drawing rays from each origin through this point (representing factor-
intensities), and then drawing parallel rays from the opposite origin.  Upon reinterpreting the 
box as representing the division of the total world’s resources between two countries, if the 
distribution of inputs between these countries lies within this constructed parallelogram, then 
for this particular equilibrium free trade will support FPE; if the allocation lies outside this 
area, then free trade without factor movements cannot support FPE for this equilibrium. 
8 That is, the complement of Φ are the allocations we can exclude as candidates for efficiency. 
9 Footnote 7 explains how the set  ( ) φ Κ  is constructed.  
10 Of course, any input division between the two countries that lies on the main diagonal leads 
to FPE since, under constant returns to scale, the countries are identical and differ only in scale.  
No net trade in goods will occur in this case.   9
should provide further insights on bundling, and other price discrimination strategies by 
imperfectly competitive producers of differentiated goods.  The present framework could also 
be expanded to accommodate Arrow-Debreu state-contingent equilibria, perhaps even when 
markets are incomplete.
11  Hopefully, efforts on related topics would also point to ways 
through which the insights provided in this paper can be sharpened. 
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While scale transformations are convenient for describing symmetry structures, one can 













ij ij Tq µ
− = .  Then bilateral symmetry in an utility functional can 
be described as 
,, ,,
,, ,,2 [() , () ] [() , () ] ,
ii a i b ii b i a
ia ib ib ia UT q T q UT q T q i = ∈Ω , or 
 
,, ,,
,, ,, 2 ˆˆ [() ,() ] [() ,() ] , ,
ii a i b ii a i b
ia ib ia ib UT q T q UT q T q i =∈ Ω   
                                                 
11 Balasko (1990) has pointed to the role of temporal, rather than taste, asymmetries in 
identifying the nature of stationary general equilibrium under extrinsic uncertainty.   10
where 
,,
,, ˆ [() ]
ia ib
ia ib qS T q =  and 
,,
,, ˆ [() ]
ib ia
ib ia qS T q = .  In this way we may conclude, for points 
not on both  1, 1, 1, 1, () () aa bb qq µ µ =  and  2, 2, 2, 2, () () aa bb qq µ µ = , that at least one of 
 
1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2,
1, 1, 1, 1, [ ( )] [ ( )], [ ( )] [ ( )],
ab ab ba ba
ab b b ba a a qS Tq STqq qS Tq STqq ≥+ − ≥+ −   
fails because otherwise an utility-preserving endowment surplus would exist. 
To identify Pareto inefficient points under symmetry and monotonicity only, let equations 
 
1, 1, 2, 2,
1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 2, 2,
1, 1, 1,
() [() ] [ ( ) ] ,
( ) [ ( )] [ ( )],
aa b a b
bbb b
bb a b a
aaa a
Kq S T q S T q q
Kq S T q S T q q
′′ ′ =+ −
′′ ′ =+ −
  
implicitly define a vector-valued function of  1, 1, (,) ab qq ′ ′  on the non-empty, compact, convex 
set [, 0 ] [ 0 ,] ab qq × .  If the function, and for both arguments, is continuous and into then 
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem is satisfied (MasColell, Whinston, and Green (1995, p. 952)) 
and a fixed point exists in the Edgeworth box.  If, in addition, one function is strictly 
increasing and the other is strictly decreasing then there exists a rectangle interior to the 
Edgeworth box where equilibrium consumption points cannot be located.  These 
monotonicity conditions are satisfied whenever one of 
 
1, 2, 1, 2,
1, 2, 1, 2,
( )() ( )()
;;





tq tqq tq tqq





holds on  [0,min[ , ]] ab qq q ∀∈ , where 
,,
,, , () () /
ij ij
ij ij ij tq d Tq d q = .  The rectangle has  1, 1, (,) ab qq ′ ′  
as one vertex, is bounded by the axes, and cannot contain a consumer origin. 
The analysis in Section 4 can also be extended to the more general context.  Since  1[]
i U ⋅ = 
2[]






11 , 1 ,
21 , 1 , 1 ,
(,) L 1 11 , 1 ,
11 , 1 , 1 , []  f i x e d
22 , 2 ,
22 , 2 , 2 ,
(,) L 2 22 , 2 ,
12 , 2 , 2 , []  f i x e d
[ ] () ()
,
[ ] () ()
[ ] () ()
,
































ia ib Tq Tq = .  Section 4 may now 




ia ib tq tq replaces  i z . 
The properties of strict quasi-concavity, strict monotonicity, differentiability, and bilateral 
symmetry (on the functional) also allow us to make deductions about equilibrium prices.  In 
general equilibrium, (A1) implies 
 
11 , 22 ,
21 , 2 2 ,
11 , 22 ,
11 , 1 2 ,
[] ( ) [] ( )
,













for Pareto efficient points so that (5) modifies to  
 
1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 1,
2, 2, 2, 2,
1, 2, 1, 1,
[ ( ) ( )][ ( ) ( )] 0,
[ ( ) ( )][ ( ) ( )] 0,
ba a b
ab ba a b
ba a b
ab b ba a a a b b
Pt q Pt q T q T q
Pt q q Pt q q T q q T q q
−− ≤
−− − −− − ≤
      
      
  
upon imposing general equilibrium efficiency conditions.  Thus, attending any solution 
,, (,) ia ib qq    are constraints on the equilibrium price ratio  / ba PP . 
   11
Appendix B 
Proof of Proposition 1:  With the end of identifying contradictions, we specify convex 
combinations of iso-utility bundles.  Restrict  2 [0,1], i i λ ∈ ∈Ω , and define 
  
12121 2 ( , , , , , ) 1 whenever 0, 0,
0o t h e r w i s e ,
Dc c c c v v λλ
++ =≥ ≠
=
             
 (B1) 
where  11 1 1 22 2 2 (,) ' ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ab vq q c c c c λλ λ λ
+ + =− − − − − −
        
.  If  () 0 D ⋅ >  for some reallocation of 
endowments that weakly increases all utility levels, then the candidate allocation 
1, 1, 2, 2, {( , )',( , )'} ab ab qq qq        cannot be Pareto efficient as a consumption bundle for utilities that 
are strictly monotone. 
When all we know of the utility functions are that they are symmetric and monotone, then 
invariance only allows us to make deductions for the lattice points of the unit square,  12 (, ) λ λ  
{(0,0),(0,1),(1,0),(1,1)}
lp ∈Λ = .  When, in addition, strict quasi-concavity is known to hold 
then we may seek violations on any  12 (, ) ( )[ 0 , 1 ][ 0 , 1 ]
lp ch λλ ∈Λ = ×  where  () ch ⋅  is the convex 
hull set operation. 






(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) 1,









λδ λ δ λ δ λ δ
λδ λ δ λ δ λ δ
+− + − +− − ≤
+− + − +− − ≤
 (B2) 
and one does not bind.  On 











+≤ + − ≤  (B3) 
where one inequality is strict.  The solution interval is non-degenerate only if  1, 1, ij rr ><  i ≠  
2 ;, ji j ∈Ω .  Rearrange (B3) to obtain (1).  For person 1, the value of  b δ  is too high while that 
of  a δ  is too low.  If (1) represents the endowment of person 1, then she will barter out of B 
and into A. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  Returning to the program provided in (B2) and now choosing 
over any  12 (, ) ( )
lp ch λλ ∈Λ = [0,1] [0,1] × , some manipulation of (B2) shows that consumption 
bundles adhering to 
 
21 1 12 2 22 1
12 2 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ,






≡− −− ≡ −
 (B4) 
with one inequality strict, constitute a violation of Pareto efficiency on the part of candidate 
optimum  1, 1, 2, 2, {( , )',( , )'} ab ab qq qq       .  Obviously the pair of inequalities is always satisfied when 
12 λ λ == 1, i.e., when there is zero displacement along either arc between an initial 
consumption bundle and an iso-utility bundle.  
If we assume that  12 rr ≥ , then we need only consider two scenarios:  12 rr >  and  12 rr =  
where we identify the common ratio as r .  For the latter case the interval in (B4) that  2 r  must   12
satisfy is degenerate.  In that case, it is clear that the set of points ( , ) ab δ δ  satisfying  () 1 D ⋅ =  
in (B1) has positive measure if and only if  1 M  and  2 M  have the same sign, i.e., the only 
possible Pareto efficient solutions are such that  120 MM <  or  12 0 MM = = .  Thus, with 
12 rrr == , the following allocations are the only potential Pareto efficient allocations: 
 
( ) 1: all allocations such that ( ) ( ) (( 1) ),
( ) 1: all allocations such that ( ),




ar r r r r
br r




<> > + −
==
>< < + −
 (B5) 
All allocations not satisfying these bounds may be excluded.  The most informative situation 
arises in case (b) when both taste intensity indices equal the index of relative scarcity, i.e., 
12 1 rr == .  Then the Pareto efficient locus must be the main diagonal.  In both cases (a) and 
(c) the remaining admissible region is a parallelogram between the axes of symmetry.
12  
Turning to scenario  12 rr > , the set of solutions ruled out by (B4) under strict quasi-concavity 
is empty if  1 0 M >  or  21 0 M M >> .  We may, however exclude as consumption bundles all 
points such that both  1 0 M ≤  and  2 0 M ≤ .  These exclusions are represented in (7). 
 
                                                 
12 To conserve on space we have not drawn the associated regions.  However, we encourage 




FIGURE 1.–Inadmissible equilibria under symmetry, 




1, 1, 2, 2, (,) (, ) ab a b qq qq =      
•
1, 1, ˆˆ (,) ab qq
•
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FIGURE 2.–Endowment-conditioned admissible equilibria



















FIGURE 3.–Implications of bilateral symmetry for marginal
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